Foreword by Green, Bruce A.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 4 Article 1 
2020 
Foreword 
Bruce A. Green 
Louis Stein Chair of Law and Director of the Stein Center for Law and Ethics at Fordham University School 
of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce A. Green, Foreword, 89 Fordham L. Rev. 1099 (2021). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol89/iss4/1 
This Foreword is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 
COLLOQUIUM 
THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN PROFESSIONAL 
REGULATION  
FOREWORD 
Bruce A. Green* 
INTRODUCTION 
In his confirmation hearings, Chief Justice Roberts analogized judges to 
baseball umpires who only call balls and strikes.1  That is a questionable 
analogy in general, given that judges’ oversight of court proceedings goes 
beyond applying the law.  But most especially, it is belied by judges’ role in 
regulating law practice, including judicial practice.  With respect to lawyers, 
judges not only apply the law but make and enforce it.  The eleven pieces in 
this collection, briefly introduced here, reflect the breadth of courts’ 
authority.2 
I.  UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW 
Courts’ power starts with the authority to determine what work may be 
done exclusively by a lawyer.  This power is exercised through the 
interpretation and enforcement of unauthorized practice of law (UPL) rules 
and statutes.  By interpreting “the practice of law” broadly, courts give 
lawyers a legal monopoly not only to advocate in court but to give legal 
advice and draft legal documents.  State judiciaries can make exceptions by 
“authorizing” nonlawyers to perform work that constitutes “the practice of 
law.”  Consequently, state judiciaries have it in their power to let nonlawyers 
assist low- and middle-income people who cannot afford a lawyer’s help with 
their legal problems.3  Some laws and administrative regulations make small 
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inroads into the lawyer’s monopoly by allowing nonlawyers to help with 
others’ legal problems in some administrative proceedings and other 
contexts, but the lawyer’s monopoly, for which courts have primary 
responsibility, is broad and consequential. 
Four coauthors—Jessica K. Steinberg, Anna E. Carpenter, Colleen F. 
Shanahan, and Alyx Mark—uncovered one effort to offset overly restrictive 
UPL rules.4  They describe how unrepresented parties in domestic violence 
cases in two jurisdictions receive help from “a shadow network of nonlawyer 
advocates,” with the knowledge, tacit consent, and collaboration of the trial 
judges.5  Working in or near the courthouses, domestic violence advocates in 
these jurisdictions meet with domestic violence survivors, counsel survivors 
(while professedly refraining from “advising” them), and help survivors 
develop evidence and draft their petitions.  Judges with heavy dockets rely 
on the advocates to help survivors in these ways and also draw on advocates’ 
views in making institutional changes.  The authors describe this as an 
example of the “de facto deregulation of the lawyer’s monopoly” and explore 
questions raised by courts’ unwillingness or inability to make the advocates’ 
role more visible and to discuss it publicly.6 
Presumably, these trial courts keep domestic violence advocates in the 
shadows because they have doubts about their power to authorize nonlawyers 
to practice law in their courts.  A state’s high court could undoubtedly adopt 
a rule or issue a ruling allowing nonlawyers to assist domestic violence 
survivors under specified conditions, but trial courts may be unsure whether 
this kind of authority trickles down to them.  The trial judges’ reluctance to 
publicly authorize nonlawyer advocates’ work means that they cannot adopt 
explicit rules regulating this work and that the advocates themselves must 
limit the help they can provide, in order to maintain that, by counseling rather 
than advising, and by keeping silent in court, they avoid practicing law. 
No doubt, the ad hoc, sub rosa, implicit “authorization” of domestic 
violence advocates better serves the survivors and the courts than the 
alternative of strictly enforcing UPL rules in a manner that leaves survivors 
entirely on their own or with a modicum of help from overtaxed judges.  But 
one must wonder why judiciaries do not expressly permit these advocates’ 
work and other work like it performed by nonlawyers.  It is hard to imagine 
that the courts and public are best served when nonlawyers help 
unrepresented parties in the shadows or not at all. 
No problem of courts’ making, and therefore in their power to solve, is 
more acute than that of access to justice for low- and middle-income clients.  
Professor Steinberg and her colleagues remind us that it is only because 
courts fail to let nonlawyers help unrepresented people with their legal 
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problems that domestic violence advocates are driven into the shadows in the 
jurisdictions Professor Steinberg and her colleagues studied—and worse, that 
domestic violence survivors elsewhere and so many others must handle legal 
problems on their own when they so desperately need help that might 
otherwise be provided by educated and regulated nonlawyers. 
II.  LICENSING PROCESSES 
Judicial authority over legal practice also includes the power to license 
lawyers.  Each state judiciary oversees admission to the state’s bar, meaning 
that each state judiciary decides what one must do to be licensed as a lawyer 
in the state—for example, whether applicants to the bar must graduate from 
an accredited law school and what they must study, whether applicants must 
take a bar exam and if so, what will be tested, and what applicants must go 
through to demonstrate the requisite “character” to practice law. 
In her article on the state judicial licensing processes, Cassandra Burke 
Robertson challenges whether contemporary bar exams are necessary and 
sufficient to ensure law school graduates’ competence to practice law, as 
broadly defined by courts.7  She points to evidence that these exams, 
exclusionary in origin, still undermine racial, socioeconomic, and gender 
diversity and she makes the case that the exams poorly test competence 
because they put a premium on memorization and are not oriented to the work 
that any particular new lawyer plans to do.  Bar exams are currently changing 
to become more useful and less discriminatory,8 but Professor Robertson 
proposes more substantial changes not only to the exams but to the licensing 
process itself.  She argues for eliminating the bar exam—that is, providing a 
“diploma privilege”—for law school graduates who practice in organizations 
and for others who are not appearing in court or handling clients’ funds.  
Professor Robertson argues that evaluations should focus on the particular 
work that the remaining others will actually perform.   
One peculiarity of the state court licensing process is that a state law 
license does not necessarily authorize a lawyer to practice law outside the 
particular state.  Each state judiciary decides what out-of-state lawyers who 
come to their states may do.  Typically, a judge presiding over a case has the 
power to allow an out-of-state lawyer on a pro hac vice basis to represent a 
party in that particular case.  State courts also adopt rules allowing out-of-
state lawyers to practice in the state temporarily, in certain circumstances, 
outside court.  But law licenses do not function like drivers’ licenses:  state 
courts do not generally offer reciprocity to lawyers from other states. 
Gabriel “Jack” Chin reminds us of a further peculiarity of our federal 
system:  that a state law license likewise does not entitle a lawyer to represent 
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a client in federal court.9  To represent a client in a federal district court or 
court of appeals, the lawyer must seek admission to that particular court’s bar 
or seek admission in a particular proceeding pro hac vice.  Moreover, after a 
state-licensed lawyer gains admission to the bar of a particular federal district 
court, the lawyer is not now entitled to practice law in all other federal district 
courts.  Professor Chin argues that this makes no sense, at least in criminal 
cases, since “federal criminal practice involves application of a single body 
of substantive criminal law, evidence, procedure, and sentencing law.”10  
Ultimately, this additional restriction, which cannot always be overcome by 
pro hac vice admission, burdens not only individual lawyers but also would-
be clients who may be denied their counsel of choice. 
III.  PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULEMAKING 
Along with courts’ power to define law practice, and to say who may 
undertake it, comes the power to adopt rules regulating lawyers’ conduct.  
Busy state judiciaries do not draft the rules themselves or oversee the rule 
drafting process, however.  They largely rely on the American Bar 
Association (ABA), which drafts the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,11 
and on their own state bar associations, which, critics say, often favor 
lawyers’ self-interest.12 
To give a contemporary example:  the District of Columbia Bar 
Association has floated a proposal to limit sophisticated corporate clients’ 
ability to negotiate with their lawyers for greater protections than afforded 
by conflict of interest rules or other rules governing the lawyer-client 
relationship.13  Apparently, it is increasingly common for corporations to ask 
their lawyers to adhere to “outside counsel guidelines” that include 
restrictions such as a promise by the lawyers not to act adversely to corporate 
affiliates or a promise not to represent competitors.14  In preventing lawyers 
from putting loyalty, competence, and confidentiality at risk, conflict of 
interest rules are meant to establish the “floor” below which lawyers may not 
go, but the new rule would turn them into a ceiling:  ostensibly to protect 
future clients’ access to a broader array of lawyers,15 the rule would forbid 
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lawyers from negotiating for more loyalty than the conflict of interest rules 
require.  It seems fairly obvious whose interests the proposed rule is really 
meant to protect, however. 
Emily S. Taylor Poppe notes that critics responding to the problem of 
regulatory capture, as well as those concerned with “the profession’s ongoing 
failure to address inequalities in access to justice,” typically advocate for 
other institutions to take responsibility for drafting professional conduct 
rules.16  She proposes, however, that state judiciaries improve their own 
rulemaking processes by adopting “evidence-based promulgation,” which 
would include “drawing on best practices developed in other rulemaking 
contexts, developing mechanisms for integrating external expertise, 
formalizing consumer protections, and considering the composition of 
rulemakers.”17  Among the reforms that would follow, says Professor Poppe, 
would be to reduce the bar’s influence by drawing on the expertise of 
nonlawyers and particularly consumers of legal services, as well as 
diversifying the bodies that decide which rules to adopt.18  If successful, these 
procedural reforms would lead to better professional conduct rules and 
legitimize the bar’s influence over their development. 
John S. Dzienkowski and John M. Golden similarly propose that, in 
adopting and interpreting professional conduct rules, state courts make 
procedural changes but of a different sort.19  They find inspiration in how 
federal courts review regulations adopted by administrative agencies and 
how they review agency opinions on questions of statutory interpretation.  
First, the coauthors advocate that before adopting rules proposed by bar 
associations, courts take a “hard look” at how the proposed rules were 
developed to ensure that the bar gave outsiders a meaningful chance to 
comment and responded reasonably and ultimately that the bar provided 
reasoned, not arbitrary, justifications for the proposed rules.20  Second, in 
deciding how much weight to give to a bar association’s opinion about what 
a rule means, courts should consider “the quality of the [bar’s deliberative] 
process and the reasoning that generated” the opinion.21 
It is important for courts to attend to the professional conduct rules and the 
processes by which they are adopted, rather than simply rubber-stamping bar 
associations’ proposals, because the rules matter.  True, they may 
unjustifiably promote lawyers’ self-interest, but conversely, as Anna Offit 
shows, they may also serve the public good.22  Professional conduct rules are 
not simply codifications of long-held and commonly accepted 
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understandings.  They have the power to change how lawyers behave, she 
explains, because, wholly apart from instilling fear of formal discipline, the 
professional conduct rules have an expressive function that discourages bad 
conduct, and they serve as a basis for informal sanctioning by one’s peers.  
The rules are vitally important, she asserts, “as both a moral compass and 
practical deterrent for self-conscious practitioners.”23 
Offit’s focus is on ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), a controversial rule recently 
broadened by the ABA. 24  The rule targets harassment and discrimination in 
the practice of law that is based on race, sex, religion, and other specified 
characteristics.  Professor Offit’s interest is in the rule’s power to discourage 
lawyers’ discriminatory use of peremptory challenges in jury trials.  She 
points to an explanatory comment recognizing that the rule does not proscribe 
“legitimate advocacy” and, in particular, that a rule violation is not 
established whenever a court finds that an advocate violated Batson v. 
Kentucky25 by using a peremptory challenge discriminatorily.26  Professor 
Offit underscores the comment’s implication:  that, under some 
circumstances, Batson violations do violate the rule.  She also emphasizes 
the rule’s extension to conduct that the lawyer “reasonably should know” is 
discriminatory or harassing.  Professor Offit is optimistic that the rule “can 
encourage greater vigilance, care, and consciousness of Batson on the part of 
attorneys engaged in routine assessments of prospective jurors.”27 
Along with courts’ power to shape lawyers’ behavior by adopting 
professional conduct rules comes oversight of the disciplinary processes 
through which these rules are enforced.  State supreme courts have the last 
word on whether a lawyer has violated the rules and should be sanctioned, 
possibly by being suspended or disbarred for doing so.  Nancy Leong 
examines state courts’ disciplinary processes with an eye toward their 
enforcement of Model Rule 8.4(g) and emphasizes the problem caused by 
many state supreme courts’ lack of racial and gender diversity.28  A court is 
likely to interpret the rule differently, she argues, if the court is diverse, rather 
than all white and mostly male.29  And diverse judges are more likely to 
empathize with lawyers and victims with whom they identify.30  Therefore, 
the demographic makeup of state courts “is a feature of the attorney 
regulation system that carries substantive consequences.”31  The problem is 
compounded, Professor Leong argues, because the disciplinary process 
operates largely in secret.32 
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2021] FOREWORD 1105 
IV.  SUPERVISION OF ADVOCATES 
Another source of courts’ authority over the bar is individual judges’ 
power to regulate lawyers appearing before them by establishing and 
enforcing standards of conduct.  Trial courts are not limited to referring 
lawyers’ misconduct to disciplinary authorities.  They can employ a host of 
formal and informal sanctions and remedies (monetary sanctions, 
disqualification of counsel, suppression of evidence, and rebukes and other 
forms of shaming, among others) for a host of transgressions (filing frivolous 
claims, courtroom misconduct, and conflicts of interest, among others).  Nor 
are courts limited to applying professional conduct rules and other laws.  
They have inherent authority to establish further expectations for advocates 
via ad hoc decision-making.  In contravention of the notion that judges, like 
umpires,33 have a limited role, consider trial judges’ role when they sanction 
courtroom misbehavior by employing their power to summarily hold lawyers 
in contempt of court:  in that event, the judge acts as witness, prosecutor, 
adjudicator, and sentencer.34 
Adam M. Gershowitz examines how trial courts regulate criminal 
prosecutors in particular.35  There is an ever-growing body of literature on 
prosecutorial misconduct and what to do about it.  Of particular concern is 
prosecutors’ failures to comply with disclosure obligations under Brady v. 
Maryland36 and other law, but prosecutors’ Batson violations and their 
improper jury arguments are also recurring concerns.  Recognizing that these 
transgressions are often the result of inadequate training, not venality, 
Professor Gershowitz proposes an innovation that would test the limits of 
courts’ regulatory power:  individual judges might require that, to be allowed 
to appear in the judge’s courtroom, prosecutors first be trained on their 
professional obligations.37  While recognizing that professional education 
requirements are ordinarily imposed by state supreme courts or legislatures, 
not by individual trial judges, Professor Gershowitz identifies three possible 
sources of authority:  trial courts’ “inherent authority to regulate the lawyers 
who appear before them,” their rarely used power to ban prosecutors for acts 
of misconduct, and the gatekeeping authority they employ when ruling on 
pro hac vice motions.38  Professor Gershowitz’s discussion underscores that 
regulating law practice is not just a task for judiciaries but is also a 
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responsibility of individual judges and that trial judges’ considerable power 
implies an obligation to use it as necessary to improve professional practice. 
One particular context where trial judges do recognize their responsibility 
to actively supervise lawyers’ conduct is in class action lawsuits, where, 
Brian T. Fitzpatrick observes, trial judges are sometimes characterized as 
fiduciaries for absent class members.39  Accordingly, civil procedure rules 
assign tasks to trial judges that they do not have in conventional litigation, 
including deciding early on whether a would-be lawyer for the class is 
adequate to serve in that role.  Professor Fitzpatrick looks at trial judges’ task 
at the end of a successful class action to set class counsel’s fees.  He draws 
on agency law to argue “that judges should set fees in the same way rational 
class members would have set them at the outset of the case if they had had 
the opportunity to do so.”40  This requires keeping in mind that like clients, 
judges have limited ability to monitor lawyers to ensure they are not serving 
their own interests by making quick but inadequate settlements, on the one 
hand, or by dragging out the litigation, on the other.  For guidance on how 
rational plaintiffs negotiate fees to avoid the agency costs of monitoring 
counsel, Professor Fitzpatrick examined how sophisticated corporate clients 
hire litigators on a contingency fee basis.  He found that corporate plaintiffs 
typically agree to a contingent fee based either on a fixed percentage of the 
recovery or on percentages that increase as the litigation moves forward.41  
This practice calls into question how judges, relying on received wisdom, 
often set fees in successful class actions—that is, either by lowering the 
lawyer’s percentage of the recovery as the recovery increases or by capping 
the amount of the recovery in light of the lodestar (the amount that class 
counsel would have been paid on an hourly fee basis).42 
For better or worse, trial judges regulate advocates’ conduct in many ways, 
and setting class counsel’s legal fees is just one of them.  Professor 
Fitzpatrick’s argument that, in this example, trial judges fall short in 
employing their regulatory—and fiduciary—authority, leads to the question 
of who has responsibility for convincing trial judges to do better.  In this 
example, the candidates include civil procedure rule drafters, appellate 
courts, and class counsel in their advocacy role.  But it seems inescapable 
that trial judges are ultimately responsible for how they exercise their 
authority in general and in the class action setting in particular.  Among other 
things, this calls for questioning received wisdom. 
 
 39. Brian T. Fitzpatrick, A Fiduciary Judge’s Guide to Awarding Fees in Class Actions, 
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V.  JUDICIAL SELF-REGULATION 
The characterization of law as a “self-regulating profession” has been 
derided as a “myth,”43 given that lawyers are not regulated by bar 
associations but by courts as well as by other institutions.44  By contrast, 
judges and judiciaries, which adopt and enforce codes of judicial conduct, 
are fairly described as self-regulating.  Consequently, judicial conduct rules, 
to an even greater extent than professional conduct rules, are subject to 
regulatory capture. 
At the same time, like professional conduct rules, judicial conduct rules 
can serve the public.  Toward that end, Tom Lininger argues that the ABA 
Model Code of Judicial Ethics,45 from which most state courts draw in 
adopting their state judicial conduct codes, should explicitly address low-
income individuals’ needs.46  Right now, he argues, the adjudicative system 
is stacked against low-income litigants, most of whom are unrepresented in 
civil cases and many of whom are represented poorly in criminal cases.  He 
offers eight proposals to make the process fairer and less discriminatory 
toward low-income individuals.  Among these, Professor Lininger suggests 
amending judicial conduct provisions to call on judges “to promote access to 
justice” and to promote procedural and substantive fairness without regard to 
parties’ and witnesses’ resources or ability to secure counsel.  Further, the 
rules should require judges to enable all litigants, including those 
representing themselves, “to be fairly heard.”47  In criminal cases, he would 
assign judges a responsibility to monitor criminal defense lawyers’ caseloads 
and to ensure in general that they are performing competently and free of 
conflicts of interest.48  And, addressing the subject of a recent ABA 
opinion,49 Lininger proposes judicial conduct rules requiring that before 
incarcerating or punishing litigants for failing to make required payments of 
fines, fees, and bail, judges inquire to ensure that these litigants actually have 
the ability to pay.50 
Finally, Renee Knake Jefferson looks at the less benevolent side of judicial 
conduct:  how judiciaries deal with judges’ sexual misconduct.51  Although 
the federal judiciary amended the Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
in 2019 to expressly target judges’ sexual misconduct and harassment of law 
clerks and others in the judicial workplace, Jefferson views this as a tepid 
 
 43. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 
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response to a problem that is largely discussed only in “whisper networks.”52  
She calls for changing judicial cultures through a combination of official 
acknowledgments when judges are found to have engaged in sexual 
misconduct and more concrete reforms:  “a comprehensive harassment 
policy” including “a confidential reporting system”; a national clearinghouse 
with responsibility for policymaking, training, and processing complaints; 
annual reporting of complaints; procedural rules making judges more 
accountable; and a ban on judges’ romantic and sexual relationships with 
judicial personnel.53  Jefferson closes with a challenge to the concept of 
judicial self-regulation:  “if the courts will not police their own, legislatures 
should step in and do so.”54 
CONCLUSION 
While each piece in this collection examines a discrete topic, the writings 
collectively pose a challenge to how courts fulfill their responsibility to 
oversee the practice of law, including judges’ own conduct.  Largely as a 
matter of happenstance rather than forethought, regulatory power—e.g., 
licensing, rulemaking, professional discipline, trial sanctioning, class action 
oversight—is divided among federal and state judiciaries and individual trial 
judges.  From the perspective of the bar, to whom the least regulation may 
seem best, the disaggregation of regulatory authority among different judicial 
bodies and judges may be welcome:  like the division of executive authority 
among administrative agencies, the division of power among different courts 
and judges serves as a check on overregulation and abuse.  But the results 
may also include discordant regulatory approaches, overreliance on bar 
associations, and the failure to use regulatory power to salutary ends. 
The writings here address a host of problems in how justice is 
administered, particularly with respect to vulnerable individuals—low-
income litigants who cannot secure lawyers, criminal defendants, absent 
class members, and victims of sexual harassment to name a few.  These are 
problems for which courts should take responsibility, whether because they 
are created or exacerbated by courts or because courts have the power to 
address them, or both.  The writings alert us to the risk that judges will use 
their considerable regulatory power to serve lawyers’ interests or their own 
interests, but they also underscore judges’ ability to use their power for the 
public good, including in innovative ways.  The writings call, explicitly or 
implicitly, for reconsidering received traditions and settled practices—
including by reconsidering the bar exam, federal district courts’ separate 
admission processes, or methods for setting legal fees in class actions.  The 
pieces also call for reconsidering courts’ processes for adopting professional 
conduct rules, for interpreting the rules, and for deciding whether and how to 
discipline lawyers for violating the rules.  On balance, the writings call for 
greater engagement—dare one say “activism”—on the part of judiciaries 
 
 52. Id. at 1201–02. 
 53. Id. at 1218. 
 54. Id. at 1221. 
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and judges in the work of regulating the practice of law, the bar, and the 
judiciary itself. 
I close by expressing my gratitude to the authors who contributed their 
works to this collection and participated in the Colloquium out of which it 
grew; to the current and outgoing Fordham Law Review editors and staff for 
editing this collection and helping to organize the Colloquium; and to 
generations of Fordham Law Review editors past, present, and future, for 
their ongoing commitment to scholarship, like the work contained in this 
collection, that advance discussion and understanding of the legal profession.  
This year’s Colloquium pieces should get judges thinking! 
